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I. INTRODUCTION
Many counties in Florida are currently in the process of developing
new wetlands protection ordinances, or revising old ones. While public
policy supports strict regulation of activities in wetlands, many coun-
ties are reluctant to adopt restrictive ordinances because of the poten-
tial for large damages awards if the regulations are later found to be
temporary takings. Recent Supreme Court case law has upheld the
payment of compensation as an appropriate remedy for overly restric-
tive land use regulations compounding the fears of local governments.
This paper summarizes the legal implications of a Model Wetlands
*Staff Attorney, Center for Governmental Responsibility, University of Florida. B.S., Rutgers
University, 1981; M.S., 1983, J.D., 1987, University of Florida.
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Protection Ordinance developed by the author., In particular, an out-
line of the mechanisms that enable local governments to minimize the
risk of paying compensation for restrictive wetlands regulations is
included.
The Model Ordinance is a prototype to aid Florida's local govern-
ments in developing their own wetlands protection ordinances. It is
necessary for local governments to adopt wetlands ordinances for sev-
eral reasons. First, wetlands perform important hydrological, ecolog-
ical, economic, and sociological functions. 2 These functions are nega-
tively impacted by improper land use.3 Many of Florida's wetlands
have already been destroyed or diminished by improper land develop-
ment. 4
1. M. ANGELO, A MODEL WETLANDS PROTECTION ORDINANCE (Center for Governmen-
tal Responsibility, 1987) [hereinafter MODEL ORDINANCE]. This article's appendix contains the
sections relevant to the article's discussion. A complete copy of the Model Ordinance is available
from the Center for Governmental Responsibility, College of Law, University of Florida, Gaines-
ville, FL 32611.
2. Both wetlands contiguous to waters of the state and isolated wetlands serve the following
important functions in the regional hydrologic cycle and ecological system: a. natural storage
and conveyance of flood waters; b. barriers to waves and erosion; c. temporary storage of surface
waters during times of flood, thereby regulating flood elevations and the timing, velocity, and
rate of flood discharges; d. reduce flood flows and the velocity of flood waters, reducing erosion
and causing flood waters to release their sediment; e. vegetation filters and holds sediment
which would otherwise enter lakes and streams; f. protect water bodies from sediments, nutri-
ents, and other natural and man-made pollutants (Wetlands vegetation filters sediment, organic
matter, and chemicals. Microorganisms utilize dissolved nutrients and breakdown organic mat-
ter); g. sources of nutrients for the commercial fish and shellfish industries; h. provide essential
breeding and predator escape habitats for many forms of waterfowl, mammals, and reptiles; i.
depended upon by almost 35% of all rare and endangered animal species; and j. provide excellent
recreational opportunities including recreational fishing, hunting, camping, photography, boating,
and nature observation; important as a source of ground and surface water. See MODEL ORDI-
NANCE, supra note 1, § I(A)(1). The wetlands functions were compiled from various sources
including: J. KUSLER, OUR NATIONAL WETLANDS HERITAGE: A PROTECTION GUIDEBOOK
(1983); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 131, § 40 (West 1981); APOXSEE, SARASOTA COUNTY'S
COMPREHENSIVE PLAN ENVIRONMENT ELEMENT (1980).
3. Improper land uses in and adjacent to wetlands may result in: flooding; erosion; decrease
in storage capacity of watersheds; increased sedimentation; decreased water quality; reduced
groundwater recharge; decreased breeding, nesting, and feeding area for water fowl and shore
birds; decreased nutrients available for fish and wildlife; decreased habitat for fish and wildlife;
and reduced aesthetic and recreational values. See generally Connor & Day, The Ecology of
Forested Wetlands in the Southeastern United States, in WETLANDS ECOLOGY AND MANAGE-
MENT (1982); R. GOODWIN & W. NIERING, INLAND WETLANDS OF THE UNITED STATES
(National Park Service, Natural History Theme Studies, No. 2, 1975).
4. The United States Army Corps (Corps) of Engineers, in attempting to provide flood
control, irrigation water, and inland waterways, has greatly modified the state's major wetlands.
Agricultural drainage and encroachment by livestock have severely modified the original vege-
tation as well. Remaining wetlands are constantly threatened by strong developmental pressures.
See R. GOODWIN & W. NIERING, supra note 3.
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Second, current federal and state wetlands regulations provide
inadequate protection to wetlands functions. For example, federal law
does not regulate any activity that does not involve discharge of dredge
or fill materials into waters of the United States. 5 Federal law further
exempts from regulation agricultural activities and only provides for
general permitting for certain other discharges.6 Federal jurisdiction
does not extend to wetlands that are not "contiguous or adjacent" to
waters of the United States. 7 Additionally, judicial interpretations of
federal regulations have severely weakened the wetlands permitting
criteria.s Likewise, Florida's Wetlands Protection Act and related reg-
ulations9 do not adequately protect the important natural functions of
the state's wetlands. The Florida Wetlands Act exempts major ac-
5. Section 404 of the federal Clean Water Act (CWA), 33 U.S.C.A. § 1344 (West 1985), is
the primary statutory authority for federal involvement in controlling the use of wetlands.
Section 404 regulates the discharge of dredged or fill material in the nation's waters. The CWA
only regulates "point sources," which are defined as "any discernable, confined and discrete
conveyance .. .from which pollutants are or may be discharged." Id. § 1362(14) (1985). Any
activity that does not involve a discharge is not subject to regulation under section 404, even if
the activity ultimately results in the total destruction of wetlands functions. For example,
discharge from non-point sources, such as agricultural and storm water runoff are not covered
by the CWA. Many other destructive activities, such as drainage, are outside the scope of the
permitting process.
6. The CWA exempts two types of activities: 1) all normal farming, silviculture, and ranching
activities; and 2) certain federal construction projects specifically authorized by Congress. In
addition to the outright exemptions, specific categories of discharges are given only limited
coverage by the regulations in the form of general permits. Section 404(e)(1) authorizes the
issuance of general permits on a nationwide, regional, or statewide basis for categories of
activities that are similar in nature and will cause only minimal adverse effects on the environ-
ment, individually and cumulatively. Section 404(e)(1) also provides for general permitting for
dredge and fill activities that take place above headwaters or in isolated wetlands and lakes of
less than ten acres.
7. The Corps' definition of wetlands is the same as the definition used in the Model Ordi-
nance. Wetlands are defined as lands that are "inundated or saturated by surface or ground
water at a frequency and duration sufficient to support, and that under normal circumstances
do support, a prevalence of vegetation typically adapted for life in saturated soil conditions."
See MODEL ORDINANCE, supra note 1, § 11(34). However, the Corps' jurisdiction does not
extend to all wetlands. For example, the Corps' regulations limit jurisdiction to wetlands that
are "contiguous or adjacent" to waters of the United States. 33 C.F.R. § 323.2(d) (1983).
Therefore, jurisdiction does not extend to isolated wetlands that are not adjacent to waters of
the United States.
8. See, e.g., 1902 Atlantic Ltd. v. Hudson, 574 F. Supp 1381 (E.D. Va. 1983) (holding the
permitting requirement that an activity be "water dependent" as merely part of a general
weighing process and not a prerequisite to the issuance of a permit); Hough v. Marsh, 557 F.
Supp. 74 (D. Mass 1982).
9. Warren S. Henderson Wetlands Protection Act of 1984, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 403.91-.908
(West 1985).
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tivities, such as agriculture, which may have significant effects on
wetland functions.10 The Act fails to give the state regulatory jurisdic-
tion over many functioning and ecologically important wetland sys-
tems.11 In addition, the Act's criteria are vague and not stringent
enough to protect wetlands from the adverse impacts of development. 12
Furthermore, federal and state governments generally protect only
wetlands of national or state concern; local wetlands often are unpro-
tected.
Third, local governments have generally had broader police powers
to regulate land use than other levels of government.13 Fourth,
Florida's 1985 Growth Management Act mandates that local govern-
ments plan for the management of wetlands in their comprehensive
plans and adopt land development regulations consistent with the
plan. 14 Finally, local governments may regulate wetlands more cheaply
and easily and with less bureaucracy than other levels of government.
10. The Henderson Wetlands Act only applies to certain "dredge and fill" activities. Ac-
tivities such as drainage, harvesting natural products, changing or obstructing water flow, and
polluting are not considered "dredge and fill," and are not subject to the Act. Section 403.912
exempts from the Act's permit criteria certain residential subdivisions and expansion of limerock
and sand mining for ten years. Id. § 403.912. Additionally, section 403.927 exempts all agricultural
activities and agricultural water management systems. The legislative intent was that Florida's
five regional water management systems be responsible for the regulation of agriculture. Id. §
403.927.
11. The Henderson Wetlands Act prohibits dredging and filling conducted in, on, or over
surface waters of the state without a permit. Id. § 403.913. DER's rules define the state's
surface waters as rivers, tributaries, streams, bays, natural lakes, the Atlantic Ocean, and the
Gulf of Mexico. The landward extent of these waters is established by dominant plant species.
Rule 174.022 of the Florida Administrative Code provides a list of about 300 vegetative species
used to determine dominance. FLA. ADMIN. CODE. 174.022. The dominance calculation is based
on relative areal extent of submerged, transitional, and upland species. The Henderson Wetlands
Act limits the landward extent of surface waters by providing several "backstops" to jurisdiction.
If hydric soils are not present, a presumption is created that the site is not a wetlands even
though the site contains a dominance of wetland vegetation. If hydric soils are present, the site
is presumed to be wetlands. Further, jurisdiction cannot extend beyond the ten-year flood line
or the area of land inundated for more than 30 consecutive days per year, whichever is more
landward. The Act also limits jurisdiction over intermittent streams to the point of intermittency,
absent a continuation of wetland vegetation. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 403.912(5) (West 1985). DER's
jurisdiction does not extend to wetlands connected by ditches to waters of the state. Further-
more, DER's jurisdiction does not cover any isolated wetlands regardless of size.
12. See supra note 10.
13. See generally 0. REYNOLDS, LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW chs. 18-21 (1982) (discussion
of local governments' powers such as zoning, eminent domain, urban renewal and public housing,
and urban planning respectively).
14. See generally Baird, A County Wide Future Land Use Plan: The Palm Beach County
Experience, 1 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 133, 139-41 (1987) (discussion of the practical impli-
cations of local growth managment planning).
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II. IMPORTANT ASPECTS OF THE ORDINANCE
A. The Regulatory Approach
The basic regulatory approach the ordinance takes is based on the
Massachusetts Wetlands Protection Act (MWPA).15 The MWPA's un-
derlying premise is the protection of important natural wetlands func-
tions.16 This "function-based" approach varies greatly from the more
commonly used "activity-based"'17 and "public interest criteria-based"1s
approaches.
Historically, many wetlands protection regulations have been "ac-
tivity-based."1 9 This approach lists permissible and impermissible wet-
lands activities. Unfortunately, this approach produces illogical results
because it permits, or fails to prohibit, harmful wetlands activities.
For instance, permissible activities often included agricultural uses.-
Agricultural activities may have extreme adverse impacts on wetland
functions. Likewise, some prohibited activities may not have signifi-
cant adverse effects on wetland functions if done on a small scale or
if mitigative measures were used. 21
The other commonly used approach to wetlands regulations is the
"public interest criteria-based" approach used in both the federal Clean
Water Act- and Florida's Wetlands Protection Act.23 Florida's ap-
proach weighs seven public interest criteria.2 The criteria include
15. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 131, § 40 (West 1981).
16. See supra note 2.
17. An example of an activity based wetlands protection regulation is the Martin County,
Florida comprehensive plan. This plan prohibits most activities in wetlands, but allows several
listed activities. These activities include: riparian access for water dependent docks and boat
ramps; access to wetlands when there is no other way to get there; removal of exotics; and one
single family home on a lot of record. See M. Hurchalla, A Community Perspective for Wetlands
Protection, in WETLAND PROTECTION: STRENGTHENING THE ROLE OF THE STATES (1984)
(discussing the Martin County Comprehensive Plan).
18. See infra notes 22-28 and accompanying text.
19. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C.A. § 1344 (West 1985) (regulating the "discharge of dredged or fill
material").
20. See, e.g., PUTNAM COUNTY, NEW YORK, FRESHWATER WETLANDS ORDINANCE
(1985). This ordinance prohibits several listed activities but allows others including "the activities
of farmers ... in grazing and watering livestock ... selectively cutting timber, draining land
or wetlands for growing agricultural products and otherwise engaging in the use of wetlands
for growing agricultural products. . . ." Id. See also 33 U.S.C.A. § 1344 (West 1985) (exempting
agricultural activities from regulation).
21. For example, single family housing at a density of one unit per five acres may not have
any significant effect on wetland function.
22. 33 U.S.C.A. § 1344 (West 1982).
23. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 403.91-.938 (West 1985).
24. Section 403.918(1) of the Florida Statutes requires a permit applicant to provide DER
with reasonable assurance that the water quality standards codified in section 403.929 will not
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA JOURNAL OF LAW & PUBLIC POLICY
some wetlands functions such as effects on fish and wildlife, navigation,
and sedimentation.? This public interest criteria approach has a better
"means to end" fit than the activity based approach. In other words,
an approach that explicitly considers wetlands' functions to determine
whether an activity is permissible protects these functions better than
merely prohibiting some activities and allowing others. However,
Florida's approach is only one step in the right direction. The seven
criteria do not include all important wetland functions.m Nor do they
link wetlands' functions to specific wetland types.- Furthermore, DER
is only required to consider these criteria.- DER has no standards to
guide it in determining how much weight to give each criterium.
The Model Ordinance directly protects wetlands' functions.2 The
Ordinance identifies a list of functions that each type of wetland is
presumed to perform 0 The Ordinance provides that any activity pro-
posed or undertaken within an area subject to regulation, which will
remove, fill, drain, dredge, or in any way alter that area, is subject
to regulation and requires the filing of a notice of intent.31 A person.
filing a notice of intent has the burden of demonstrating that either
a) the particular wetland does not perform any of the functions that
be violated. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 403.918(1) (West 1985). Florida Statute section 403.928(2)(a)
requires DER to consider the following criteria in wetlands permitting decisions:
1. Whether the project will adversely affect the public health, safety, or welfare
or the property of others; 2. Whether the project will adversely affect the conser-
vation of fish and wildlife, including endangered or threatened species, or their
habitats; 3. Whether the project will adversely affect navigation or the flow of
water or cause harmful erosion or shoaling; 4. Whether the project will adversely
affect the fishing or recreational values or marine productivity in the vicinity of
the area; 5. Whether the project will be of a temporary or permanent nature; 6.
Whether the project will adversely affect or will enhance significant historical and
archeological resources; 7. The current condition and relative value of functions
being performed by areas affected by the proposed activity.
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 403.928(2)(a) (West 1985).
25. Id. § 403.918(2)(a).
26. For example, section 403.918(2)(a) does not directly require DER to consider effects
on flood conveyance, flood storage, pollution control, species diversity, and evapotranspiration.
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 403.918(2)(a) (1985).
27. Id. § 403.918.
28. Section 403.918(2)(a) of the Florida Statutes states that "[i]n determining whether a
project is not contrary to the public interest, or is clearly in the public interest, the department
shall consider and balance the following criteria .... " (emphasis added). Id. § 403.918(2)(a).
29. MODEL ORDINANCE, supra note 1, § I(B).
30. See id. § V(C) (not in Appendix due to length). The wetland functions were compiled
from various sources. See supra note 2.
31. MODEL ORDINANCE, supra note 1, § IV(1).
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it is presumed to, or b) the proposed activity will have an insignificant
effect on any of the functions the wetland is presumed to perform. 2
If the applicant cannot meet this burden of proof on either of these
two issues, the applicant does not receive a permit and can not proceed
with the proposed activity.3
B. Cumulative Impacts and Water Dependency Exemption
Under the Model Ordinance, an applicant must show that the
cumulative impacts of all property owners in the wetland system car-
rying out the same activity as the applicant proposes would have an
insignificant effect on the wetland's functions.3 An applicant can show
this in one of several ways. First, the applicant could show that even
if every landowner in the wetland system carried on the proposed
activity the cumulative effect would be insignificant.- Second, the
applicant can show that the proposed activity is unique, and therefore,
would not be attempted by other landowners.3 Third, the applicant
can show that other landowners are barred from attempting that ac-
tivity either because they have given a conservation easement on their
land or because their land is in a Special Management Area which
prohibits the proposed activity 7
Some activities having a significant adverse effect on wetland func-
tions are of such important public interest and are so dependent on
being located in or near water that they should be allowed.- Under
the Model Ordinance, these water dependent activities are permissible
if the public interest served by the activity substantially outweighs
its adverse environmental effects and no practicable alternative
exists.3 Water dependency, however, should be construed narrowly
and does not include waterfront housing. 4° Permissible water depen-
dent activities which have significant adverse effects must be designed
to minimize such effects.41 If adverse effects cannot be reduced suffi-
ciently, mitigation is required.-
32. Id. § V(B).
33. Id.
34. Id. § V(B)(3).
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. § V(G). The list of water dependent activities in this section is based on those in
the Florida Administrative Code. FLA. ADMIN. CODE § 17-12.090 (Short Form Applications).
39. MODEL ORDINANCE, supra note 1, § V(G)(1).
40. Id. § V(G)(2).
41. Id. § V(G)(1).
42. Id. Mitigation refers to actions required to be taken by applicants to compensate for
environmental impacts of permitted activities. This term includes: avoiding the impact altogether
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C. Variances
The Model Ordinance has a variance procedure that minimizes the
risk that the Ordinance, as applied to an individual landowner, results
in a taking requiring the payment of compensatory damages for the
period of non-use." A local government may grant a variance where
an applicant is successful in challenging the Ordinance as being so
restrictive as to constitute a taking.- In general, a taking is found
only where the Ordinance's application is so restrictive that it deprives
the landowner of substantially all use of his property.45 Courts consider
factors such as the reasonable expectations of the landowner and
whether the site contains developable uplands as well as wetlands in
determining whether a taking occurs.46 If the local government can
show an alternative design plan that allows some use of the property,
it need not grant a variance. Conversely, the local government may
grant a variance if it determines that the Ordinance's application re-
sults in a taking. A variance should only be granted to the extent
necessary to allow a reasonable use of the property to avoid a taking.
Instead of granting a variance, the local government may choose to
purchase the environmentally important lands through its eminent
domain power. These lands should be restricted by conservation ease-
ments to protect them from future development. 47
III. LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS
A. Authority to Enact: Home Rule Powers
The authority to regulate land use and development is vested in
the states through the tenth amendment of the United States Constitu-
tion." The Florida Constitution, Article VIII, delegates this authority
to local governments as home rule powers. 49 Both the Florida Constitu-
by not taldng a certain action or parts of an action, minimizing impacts by limiting the degree
of magnitude of an action and its implementation, rectifying the impact by repairing, rehabilitat-
ing, or restoring the affected environment, reducing or eliminating impact over time by preser-
vation and maintenance operations during the life of the action, and compensating for the impact
by replacing or providing substitute resources or environments. Id. § 111(21).
43. Id. § VII(F).
44. Id. § VII(F)(1).
45. Id. § VII(F)(2). See also infra notes 127-75 and accompanying text.
46. See generally D. HAGMAN & J. JUERGENSMEYER, URBAN PLANNING & LAND DE-
VELOPMENT CONTROL 318-24 (2d ed. 1986) (discussion of the Takings Clause's application to
land use regulations).
47. See infra note 165 for the definition of a conservation easement.
48. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
49. FLA. CONST. art. VIII, §§ 1-2.
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tion and Florida legislation treat home rule powers for municipalities,
charter counties, and non-charter counties separately.
1. Municipalities
The Florida Constitution grants broad home rule powers to
municipalities. Article VIII, Section 2(b) empowers municipalities to
"conduct municipal government, perform municipal services, and...
exercise any power for municipal purposes except as otherwise pro-
vided by law." ° Although the Florida Constitution's clear intent is to
grant broad home rule powers to municipalities, the Florida Supreme
Court in 1972 took a narrower view. In City of Miami Beach v.
Fleetwood Hotel, Inc.51 the Court held that the Florida Constitution
did not alter the rule that the paramount source of municipality author-
ity is in its charter. The Court indicated the charter grants to the
municipality all the powers it possesses unless other statutes apply. 52
In response to this decision, the Florida Legislature enacted the Munic-
ipal Home Rule Powers Act in 1973. This Act reaffirmed the broad
grant of home rule powers to municipalities.- The Florida Supreme
Court has since expressly upheld the validity of this legislative dele-
gation of powers to municipalities.-
2. Charter Counties
The Florida Constitution grants to charter counties the same broad
home rule powers that municipalities exercise. Article VIII, Section
1(g) vests in charter counties "all powers of local self-government not
inconsistent with general law, or with special law approved by vote
of the electors. '"- Further support for broad home rule powers in
charter counties can be found in Florida Statutes, Chapter 125. This
chapter grants numerous and extensive powers to counties and ex-
pressly states "the provisions of this section shall be liberally construed
in order to . .. secure for the counties the broad exercise of home
rule powers authorized by the State Constitution."'- Courts have held
this statute is sufficient to permit counties to execute the home rule
provisions of the Constitution. 57
50. Id. art. VII, § 2(b).
51. 261 So. 2d 801 (Fla. 1972).
52. Id. at 803.
53. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 166.021(1) (West 1985).
54. See City of Miami Beach v. Forte Towers, Inc., 305 So. 2d 764 (Fla. 1975).
55. FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(g).
56. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 163.3194(1) (West 1985).
57. See Speer v. Olson, 367 So. 2d 207 (Fla. 1978).
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3. Non-Charter Counties
The Florida Constitution only grants limited home rule powers to
non-charter counties. Article VIII, Section 1(f) provides non-charter
counties "shall have such power of self-government as is provided by
general or special law" and "may enact, in a manner prescribed by
general law, county ordinances not inconsistent with general or special
law. ' " Therefore, non-charter counties must look to enabling legisla-
tion to define the limits of their home rule authority. Chapter 125 of
the Florida Statutes confers on all counties, charter and non-charter,
the authority to perform acts that are not inconsistent with other
general or special laws of the state and are necessary to carry out
governmental objectives. 9 The Florida Supreme Court has upheld this
statute and its broad grant of home rule powers to all counties.- °
In sum, the broad grants of home rule powers in Article VIII and
chapters 166 (Municipalities) and 125 (Counties) enable municipalities
and counties to enact land use regulations subject to specific limitations
imposed by state statute. No Florida statute exists prohibiting local
governments from enacting wetlands protection ordinances.
Strengthening local governments' authority to regulate wetlands
is the fact the Florida Wetlands Protection Act of 1984 provides that
"[n]othing [in this Act] alters or modifies the powers of a local govern-
ment or precludes a local government from adopting a dredge and fill
regulatory program, provided the local governmental program is first
approved by the department pursuant to section 403.182. "61 This sec-
tion allows cities and counties to establish and administer local pollution
control programs if: a) DER approves their ability to adequately meet
the requirements of 403; b) the requirements of the local law are
compatible with, or stricter or more extensive than those of 403; c)
the local law provides for enforcement; and d) the local law provides
for administrative organization, staff, financial resources, and other
resources necessary to carry out the program. 62
Further, the Local Government Comprehensive Planning and Land
Development Act (LGCPLDA) mandates that local governments adopt
58. FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § l(f).
59. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 125.01 (West 1985). In addition, the statute's provisions "shall be
liberally construed in order to effectively carry out the purpose of [Chapter 125] and to secure
for the counties the broad exercise of home rule powers authorized by the States." Id. §
125.01(3)(b).
60. See Speer v. Olson, 367 So. 2d 207 (Fla. 1979).
61. FLA. STAT. § 403.916 (West 1987).
62. Id. § 403.182.
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a comprehensive plan and enact land development regulations which
contain provisions necessary or desirable to implement the plan. 63
These land development regulations must be consistent with the com-
prehensive plan.64 Section 163.3177 of the LGCPLDA requires each
comprehensive plan to include certain required elements. Among these
required elements is an element "for the conservation, use, and pro-
tection of natural resources in the area, including . . .wetlands. ' 65
This section further requires that the land use map or series of maps
in the future land use element generally depict and identify rivers,
bays, lakes, flood plains, harbors, estuarine systems, and wetlands.6
Section 163.3213 of the LGCPLDA requires that local governments
adopt and enforce land development regulations that are consistent
with their adopted comprehensive plan.67 Included in the minimum
requirements for these land development regulations are: regulation
of the use of land and water; provisions for the protection of potable
wellfields; regulation of areas subject to seasonal and periodic flooding;
provisions for drainage and stormwater management; and protection
of environmentally sensitive lands designated in the comprehensive
plan. 68
In summary, local governments have the authority to regulate land
use under the broad home rule powers that state constitutional and
legislative provisions confer. Additionally, the Henderson Wetlands
Act explicitly reserves to the local governments the power to carry
out their own wetlands regulation. Finally, the LGCPLDA mandates
that local governments adopt a conservation plan for the conservation,
use, and protection of wetlands. The LGCPLDA also requires that
local governments adopt land development regulations necessary to
implement the plan.
B. Constitutional Limitations
The enactment of a wetlands protection ordinance must be pursuant
to authority the state constitution or state statutes grant. It must
also meet five other constitutional requirements. First, the ordinance's
provisions must be reasonably related to a valid regulatory objective
(substantive due process). Second, the procedures local governments
use in implementing the ordinance must be fair (procedural due pro-
63. Id. §§ 163.3161-3243.
64. Id. § 163.3202(3).
65. Id. § 163.3177(4)(d).
66. Id.
67. Id. § 163.3213.
68. Id.
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cess). Third, the ordinance must not illegally discriminate in favor of
particularly classes of persons or property (equal protection). Fourth,
the regulation must not be so confiscatory as to constitute a taking
without just compensation (eminent domain). Fifth, the delegation of
governmental regulatory authority must be accompanied by sufficient
standards and guidelines to direct officials' decision-making. Each of
these constitutional restraints are considered in the next sections.
1. Substantive Due Process
Wetlands protection regulations are an exercise of the "police
power" which is the inherent power of state and local governments
to regulate to protect the health, safety, morals, or general welfare
of the people.69 Generally, courts are reluctant to overturn local gov-
ernment land use regulations as invalid exercises of the police power.7
Courts take the position that citizens should determine what regulatory
measures are needed for their own self-government through their local
legislative body.71 Circumstances exist, however, in which courts will
find a legislative body has exceeded its authority even in the absence
of any express constitutional or legislative prohibition. This limitation
on police power is termed substantive due process analysis. The sub-
stantive due process doctrine is derived from the fourteenth amend-
ment to the United States Constitution which states "[nior shall any
state deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due pro-
cess of law.' ' 72 Under contemporary constitutional analysis, when the
government deprives persons Qf fundamental rights, it must show the
deprivation is necessary to promote a compelling state interest. 73 In
the case of most land use regulations, no fundamental rights are in-
volved. Thus, the regulations must only bear some rational relationship
to a legitimate end of government. 74 A two part test determines
whether a regulation meets this standard. First, the regulation's ob-
jectives must be valid. 75 Proper police power objectives are those that
bear a substantial relationship to the protection of the health, safety,
69. See generally D. HAGMAN & J. JUERGENSMEYER, supra note 46, at 296.
70. Id.
71. See J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA, & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 358 (3d ed. 1986)
(discussing the judiciary's recognition that other branches of government should be granted
broad latitude in dealing with issues of "economic social welfare").
72. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
73. See J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA, & J. YOUNG, supra note 71, at 358.
74. Id.
75. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954).
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morals, and general welfare of the public. 76 Second, the regulation
must be reasonably related to the achievement of the valid objectives.'
a. Valid Objective
Wetlands protection regulations are only valid if enacted for pur-
poses within the scope of proper police power objectives. The scope
of permissible regulatory objectives under the police power is very
broad. In the leading case of Berman v. Parker,78 the United States
Supreme Court stated with regard to the police power:
An attempt to define its reach or trace its outer limits is
fruitless, for each case must turn on its own facts. The def-
inition is essentially the product of legislative determination
addressed to the purposes of government, purposes neither
abstractly nor historically capable of complete definition...
. Public safety, public health, morality, peace and quiet, law
and order - these are some of the more conspicuous exam-
ples of the traditional application of the police power to
municipal affairs. Yet they merely illustrate the scope of the
power and do not delimit it .... The concept of the public
welfare is broad and inclusive .... The values it represents
are spiritual as well as physical, aesthetic as well as mone-
tary. It is within the power of the legislature to determine
that the community should be beautiful as well as healthy,
spacious as well as clean, well-balanced as well as carefully
patrolled.-
This passage reflects the breadth of the legitimate exercise of police
powers. The Model Ordinance lists a number of objectives that require
the exercise of broad police powers:
[t]o minimize the potential for property damage and personal
injury from flooding; to prevent increases in erosion; to main-.
tain optimum storage capacity of watersheds; to prevent in-
creased sedimentation; to maintain water quality; to maintain
recharge for groundwater aquifers; to maintain breeding,
nesting, and feeding areas for waterfowl and shore birds; to
maintain the exchange of nutrients needed for fish and other
wildlife; to maintain habitat for fish and other wildlife; to
maintain sites needed for education and scientific research;
76. Id.
77. Powell v. Pennsylvania, 128 U.S. 678, 684-85 (1888).
78. 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
79. Id. at 32-33.
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to protect the public's rights in navigable waters; to protect
recreation opportunities; to protect aesthetic and property
values. s
Courts have expressly or impliedly upheld all of these objectives as
legitimate under the substantive due process doctrine s
For example, the Florida Supreme Court has stated that "[p]rotec-
tion of environmentally sensitive areas and pollution control are legiti-
mate concerns within the police power." s Likewise, a Florida appellate
court found that wetlands play an important role in protecting against
flooding and storm damage. 53 Recognizing that the Florida Constitution
establishes a policy of conserving and protecting the state's natural
resources and scenic beauty, 84 the court stated "there is no question
that the police power may be exercised to protect and preserve the
environment."8o Other Florida courts have upheld as proper police
power objectives: protection of public water supply;6 reduction of air
pollution;7 protection of the public trust in navigable waters;88 stabili-
zation of growth to promote orderliness, convenience, health, and
beauty;s protection of aesthetics;9° protection of property values;91 and
residential interests in comparative tranquility and quiet seclusion. 9
Similarly, courts in other states have upheld as valid objectives of the
police power: prevention of pollution; 93 avoidance of flood damage;94
maintenance of groundwater levels;95 protection of fish and wildlife
80. See MODEL ORDINANCE, supra note 1, § I(B).
81. See D. HAGMAN & J. JUERGENSMEYER, supra note 46, at 296-98 (stating courts will
uphold land use regulations that serve legitimate health, safety, or welfare objectives).
82. Graham v. Estuary Properties, Inc. 399 So. 2d 1374, 1381, cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1083
(1981).
83. Indialantic v. McNulty, 400 So. 2d 1227, 1230-32 (Fla. 5th D.C.A. 1983).
84. FLA. CONST. art. II, § 7.
85. 400 So. 2d at 1232.
86. Lovequist v. Conservation Comm'n of Town of Dennis, 393 N.E.2d 858 (Mass. 1979).
87. Miami Beach v. Hogan, 63 So. 2d 493 (Fla. 1953), cert denied, 346 U.S. 819 (1953).
88. State ex. rel. Wilcox v. T.O.L., Inc., 206 So. 2d 69 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1968).
89. St. Petersburg v. Aiken 208 So. 2d 268 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1968), rev'd on other grounds,
217 So. 2d 315 (1968); Aiken v. Dacis, Inc., 106 Fla. 675, 143 So. 658 (1932).
90. International Co. v. Miami Beach, 90 So. 2d 906 (Fla. 1965); Miami Beach v. Ocean &
Inland Co., 147 Fla. 480, 3 So. 2d 364 (1941); Rotenburg v. Ft. Pierce, 202 So. 2d 782 (Fla.
4th D.C.A. 1967).
91. Trachsel v. Tamarac, 311 So. 2d 137 (Fla. 4th D.C.A. 1975).
92. Memphis v. Greene, 451 U.S. 100 (1981).
93. Potomac Sand & Gravel v. Governor of Maryland, 293 A.2d 241 (Md. 1972).
94. State v. A. Capuano Bros., 384 A.2d 610 (R.I. 1978).
95. Lovequist v. Conservation Comm'n of Town of Dennis, 393 N.E.2d 858 (Mass. 1979).
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habitat;9 and preservation of plant communities.Y In summary, the
Model Ordinance's objectives are valid exercises of local governments'
police powers.
b. Reasonableness
Substantive due process also requires that the means local govern-
ments choose to accomplish their objectives must be reasonable. Courts
generally defer to local governments and presume that properly
enacted ordinances are valid.- An applicant challenging an ordinance
may overcome this presumption by demonstrating that it is not even
"fairly debatable" that the means chosen are reasonably related to the
valid regulatory objective.- This burden, however, is extremely dif-
ficult to meet. Courts routinely find the means employed by the local
government to be "reasonably necessary" to accomplish the valid police
power objective. 1°°
A leading Florida case discusses the reasonable relation prong of
the substantive due process analysis. The court in Indialantic v.
McNulty,10 considered a constitutional challenge to a zoning ordinance
restricting the use of certain wetland and coastal areas. The court
held that because of the important role that wetlands play in protecting
inland areas from flood and storm damage, the applicant failed to show
that the ordinance was arbitrary or more severe than necessary to
achieve valid police power purposes. 1° The court noted that when a
zoning ordinance is challenged as being invalid on its face, courts
presume the ordinance is valid; then, if it is fairly debatable that the
ordinance is reasonably related to public health, safety, and welfare,
the court will upheld the ordinance. The court's rationale was that
substituting a judicial determination of the best means to further the
ordinance's objective for that of the local government violates the
separation of powers doctrine.1° Because zoning is a legislative func-
tion, courts should not act as "super zoning boards."' 4 The court
96. Potomac Sand & Gravel v. Governor of Maryland, 293 A.2d 241 (Md. 1972).
97. Id.
98. See Powell v. Pennsylvania, 128 U.S. 678, 684-85 (1888); Parking Facilities, Inc. v. City
of Miami Beach, 88 So. 2d 141 (Fla. 1956).
99. Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388 (1926); City of Miami Beach v. Lachman,
71 So. 2d 148, 152 (Fla. 1953).
100. See J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA, & J. YOUNG, supra note 71, at 358.
101. 400 So. 2d 1227 (Fla. 5th D.C.A. 1983).
102. Id. at 1233.
103. Id. at 1230.
104. Id.
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further noted that the burden of showing the ordinance is invalid is
on the challenger, not the zoning authority.105
Because courts are unwilling to find zoning or land use ordinances
violative of the substantive due process doctrine, it is unlikely that
any substantive due process challenge to the Model Ordinance would
be successful. Furthermore, the Indialantic decision provides direct
support of the constitutionality of restrictive wetlands regulations.
2. Procedural Due Process
The fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution pro-
vides that states shall not deprive persons of their property without
due process of law. 10 Three main issues are involved in any procedural
due process case:
1. Was the deprivation the result of state action?
2. Is there a legally protected property interest at stake?
3. Was an appropriate hearing provided?1 7
First, the issue whether a deprivation of property rights resulted
from "state action" rarely arises in land use regulation challenges. In
the procedural due process context, the enactment of land use regula-
tions by local governments are generally "state actions. '"11° Second,
state law determines whether a legally protected property interest
exists. 09 In the land use context, legally protected property interests
include all of the traditional forms of real and personal property plus
any entitlements to governmental benefits. 10
The issue more likely to be disputed in wetlands regulations cases
is whether the local government followed adequate procedures. A
landowner making a procedural due process challenge must show that
the local government failed to provide adequate procedural safeguards
in depriving the landowner of the asserted property interest. A mere
deviation from established procedures is insufficient to establish a
procedural due process violation.", In these types of cases, the court
will only look to see if the local government treated the landowner
arbitrarily or discriminatorily. 112
105. Id.
106. U.S. CONST. amend. XVI.
107. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
108. Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938).
109. Roth, 408 U.S. at 507.
110. See J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA, & J. YOUNG, supra note 71, at 473-476.
111. See Creative Environments, Inc. v. Estabrook, 680 F.2d 822, 833 (1st Cir. 1982).
112. See, e.g., Glassman v. Township of Falls, 547 F. Supp. 362, 369-70 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
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Similarly, landowners have difficulty in successfully challenging
land use regulations based on the failure of established procedures to
meet minimum due process standards. In the land use context, these
minimum procedural safeguards require that local government provide
a landowner with the following: (1) notice of the relevant public hear-
ing;13 (2) an opportunity to be represented by counsel to present their
views;114 (3) consideration of the information presented by the landow-
ners;1 5 and (4) judicial review in state court. 1 16 The Model Wetlands
Protection Ordinance provides all of these constitutionally required
procedural safeguards.1 7
3. Equal Protection
The fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution pro-
vides that no state shall deny persons within its jurisdiction equal
protection of the laws.118 A wetlands regulation that imposes different
burdens on different classes of lands may be challenged on equal pro-
tection grounds. Unless the regulation's classification system impinges
on a fundamental right" 9 or is based on a suspect class,120 however,
the local government need only show a rational relationship exists
between the classification and a legitimate government interest. There-
fore, a wetlands ordinance that merely burdens different classes of
lands differently must only meet the rational relation test to be valid.
Courts have routinely upheld land use regulations that burden
different classes of land differently. For instance, equal protection
challenges have failed in cases involving (1) the regulation of coastal
wetlands but not inland wetlands, 2' (2) the regulation of natural wet-
113. See J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA, & J. YOUNG, supra note 71, at 484.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. See, e.g., Creative Environments, Inc. v. Eastbrook, 680 F.2d 822, 830-31 (1st Cir.
1982); Molgard v. Town of Caledonia, 527 F. Supp. 1073, 1082 83 (E.D. Wis. 1981).
117. See generally MODEL ORDINANCE, supra note 1, § VII (includes notice, public hearing,
-variances procedures, etc.).
118. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
119. Fundamental rights are limited to the rights of freedom of religion, free speech, and
privacy. See J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA, & J. YOUNG, supra note 71, at 370-72. Land use
regulations rarely impinge on these fundamental rights or liberties. See D. HAGMAN & J.
JUERGENSMEYER, supra note 46, at 300-01.
120. Suspect classes are limited to classifications based on race or alienage. See J. NOWAK,
R. ROTUNDA, & J. YOUNG, supra note 71, at 330. Local wetlands protection ordinances generally
should not infringe upon suspect classes because the classification schemes are based on differ-
ences among types of land not on race or alienage.
121. J.M. Mills, Inc. v. Murphy, 352 A.2d 661 (R.I. 1976).
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lands but not manmade wetlands,- = and (3) the regulation of coastal
wetlands based on the degree of already existing development. 12
The Model Ordinance differentiates between both different types
of wetlands systems and functioning versus non-functioning wet-
lands. 24 These classifications will likely be upheld because rational
reasons exist for them. Differentiating between different types of wet-
lands is necessary because different wetland types perform different
functions and have different ecological and economic values.'2 Because
the Model Ordinance's objective is to protect important wetland func-
tions, it is reasonable to vary the restrictiveness of the regulation
depending on the functions that the particular type of wetland is
known to perform. Likewise, because degraded wetlands may not
perform as many functions as healthy wetlands, it is rational to provide
for stricter regulations for healthy wetlands to insure the protection
of these functions. Furthermore, the Model Ordinance provides a
mechanism by which an applicant can overcome the presumption the
particular wetlands performs the functions that type of wetlands pre-
sumptively performs. 126
4. The Taking Issue
The fifth amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits
the government from taking private property for public use without
payment of just compensation. 127 Historically, this clause applied only
where the government took actual physical possession or title to pri-
vate property and used it for public purposes such as roads, dam
construction, or urban renewal.'? In this century, however, the taking
concept is greatly expanded. Physical seizure or invasion is not re-
quired; instead, any overly restrictive regulation may give rise to a
claim that a taking has occurred and that just compensation should
be paid. 129
122. Potomac Sand & Gravel v. Governor of Maryland, 293 A.2d 241 (Md. 1972).
123. Sands Point Harbor v. Sullivan, 136 N.J. Super. 436, 346 A.2d 612 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1975).
124. MODEL ORDINANCE, supra note 1, § V(B)(2)(b).
125. See id., § V(C). Because of its length, this section of the Model Ordinance, which
identifies the functions and values of wetlands the Ordinance protects, is not in the Appendix.
126. Id. § V(B)(2)(a).
127. U.S. CONST. amend. V. See also Simon, The Supreme Court's 1987 "Takings" Triad:
An Old Hat In A New Box or A Revolution in Takings Law?, 1 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y,
103 (1987) (historical overview of takings cases).
128. See J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA, & J. YOUNG, supra note 71, at 401.
129. Id.
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The Model Ordinance contains fairly strict limitations on what ac-
tivities can be performed in wetlands.13° The strong public policy of
protecting important wetland functions favors these strict limitations.
Nevertheless, local governments that impose strict land use regula-
tions on private property must be concerned whether their regulations
are so restrictive as to constitute a taking without just compensation.
The variance procedures provided for in the Model Ordinance131 are
designed to eliminate the possibility that the Ordinance's provisions
amount to a taking.
The determination of whether a taking occurs requires a balancing
of public interests against the interest of the private landowner. For
example, in Agins v. City of Tiburnon,13 the Supreme Court stated
"[t]he determination that governmental action constitutes a taking is
• . . a determination that the public at large, rather than a single
owner, must bear the burden of an exercise of state power in the
public interest."133 In Agins the city had adopted an open space zoning
ordinance that restricted previously purchased five acre tracts to single
residence. The Court noted the important and legitimate government
goals of an open space ordinance which benefits landowners as well
as the public by assuring careful orderly development.-a4 Recognizing
that the zoning did not prevent the best use of the land or extinguish
any fundamental attribute of ownership, the Court held the good faith
planning did not burden landowners enjoyment of their property as
to constitute a taking.' 35
Whether a land use regulation amounts to a taking depends on the
specific circumstances of the case. Several issues are involved in the
taking determination.136 The first issue requires a determination of the
existing natural conditions on the site. In Turnpike Realty Co. v.
Town of Dedham137 the court held that an ordinance that restricted
floodplains to agricultural and recreational uses did not constitute a
taking. Because the ordinance was intended to prevent flooding dam-
age, the court characterized it as an exercise of the police power, not
130. See generally MODEL ORDINANCE, supra note 1, § IV (activities subject to regulation
under the ordinance).
131. Id. § VII(F).
132. 447 U.S. 255 (1979).
133. Id. at 260.
134. Id. at 261-62.
135. Id. at 262-63.
136. The Model Ordinance is designed to address all of these issues. See generally MODEL
ORDINANCE, supra note 1, § VII (administrative aspects of ordinance).
137. 284 N.E.2d 891 (Mass. 1972).
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of eminent domain. The court noted that although the ordinance sub-
stantially restricted the applicant's use of his land, such restriction
must be balanced against the potential harm to the public from over-
development of a floodplain.13
Similarly, in Just v. Marinette County,"* the Supreme Court of
Wisconsin upheld severe restrictions on the use of flood prone lands.
In Just, the landowner was prosecuted for violating a shorelands zon-
ing ordinance by filling land adjoining a lake. The landowner claimed
the ordinance was a taking. The court noted that the purpose of the
restrictions was to protect navigable waters from degradation and
deterioration and ruled against the landowner. The court stated a
landowner has no absolute right to alter the natural character of his
land to use it for a purpose for which it was unsuited in its natural
state especially where injury results to the rights of others. 140 The
court stated "[t]he changing of wetlands and swamps to the damage
of the general public by upsetting the natural environment and the
natural relationships is not a reasonable use of that land which is
protected from police power regulation."" 41
In the Florida case of Smith v. Clearwater,- the court followed
the approaches of Turnpike Realty and Just by considering the exist-
ing conditions of the land in making the takings determination. In
Smith, a landowner alleged that a city zoning ordinance that rezoned
more than one half of the landowner's property as "aquatic lands"
usable only for recreational purposes constituted a taking. The court
held the zoning change did not deny the owner's beneficial use of the
property, and thus, was not a taking requiring just compensation."-
The court stated that although the new zoning law severely restricted
the use of the owner's wetlands, the owner could not have done much
with the wetland without the zoning change.-" It was unlikely the
owner could have obtained permission to fill the wetlands even without
the zoning restrictions.'W" Furthermore, the court noted that serious
environmental considerations justified the zoning. 146
138. Id.
139. 201 N.W.2d 761 (Wis. 1972).
140. Id. at 768.
141. Id.
142. 383 So. 2d 681 (1980).
143. Id. at 685.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
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The Model Ordinance addresses this issue by restricting activities
that destroy important wetland functions. 147 The destruction of impor-
tant wetland functions, such as flood prevention, results in harm to
the public. In most taking challenges to wetlands regulations, the
harm to the public from allowing the proposed activity outweighs the
benefit to the individual land owner. This assessment is based on the
private uses of wetlands in their natural condition, not on the land in
the altered condition necessary for development.
The second issue is whether a taking occurs on a site that contains
both developable upland areas and wetlands. The United States Su-
preme Court in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City18
indicated that the determination of whether a governmental action
constitutes a taking depends on how the regulation applies to the
property as a whole. In Penn Central the owner of Grand Central
Station challenged New York City's historic landmark protection ordi-
nance. The ordinance designated the station as an historic landmark
and gave the city a right to prevent structural alterations that would
be incompatible with architectural values. The ordinance also gave
the owner transferrable property development rights. The owner filed
suit claiming a taking when the city rejected the owner's plans to
construct a fifty story addition over the landmark.149
The Court held the rejection of the plan under the ordinance did
not constitute a taking. 50 The Court's decision rested on the fact that
the owner's property interest was merely diminished, not totally de-
stroyed, and the regulation did not affect the property's existing use.
The Court determined that the parcel as a whole was still useful. The
Court stated '[t]aking' jurisprudence does not divide a single parcel
into discrete segments and attempt to determine whether rights in a
particular segment have been entirely abrogated.151
In the leading Florida case, Graham v. Estuary Properties, 152 the
Florida Supreme Court found that a regulation that reduced the size
of permissible development to one half of that proposed did not consti-
tute a taking. A developer owned 6,500 acres of land adjacent to
coastal waters. About 2,800 acres were red mangroves and 1,800 were
black mangroves. The developer was denied approval for dredging
147. MODEL ORDINANCE, supra note 1, § IV (activities subject to regulation under the
Ordinance).
148. 438 U.S. 104, 131 (1978).
149. Id. at 108-09, 115-22.
150. Id. at 138.
151. Id. at 130-31, 136-38.
152. 399 So. 2d 1374 (Fla. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1083 (1981).
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out the black mangroves and filling the remaining lands to construct
26,500 dwelling units. The developer challenged the denial to develop
in the black mangroves as a taking.153 The court determined the denial
was not a taking based on the fact that the development proposal
would have adversely affected important public interests in the estuary
and that the developer failed to show the regulation had destroyed
its beneficial interest.15 ' The court noted that the regulation merely
reduced the size of the proposed development by one-half.
The Model Ordinance addresses this second issue by requiring the
local government to determine whether the proposed development site
contains developable uplands as well as wetlands.- If so, under the
Penn Central and Estuary Properties rationales, a taking should not
be found. Likewise, a taking should not be found if the local govern-
ment has a mechanism that provides owners of wetlands with trans-
ferrable density rights or the right to create "cluster developments"
on uplands of higher densities than normally permitted.
A third issue requires a determination of the reasonable develop-
ment expectations of the landowner/applicant. Courts have held that
an otherwise valid ordinance may be a taking if it frustrates specific
investment-backed expectations of the landowner. In Penn Central,
the Court held that the denial of the proposed fifty story addition to
Grand Central Station did not amount to a taking in part because the
owners could continue using the station as they had for the past
sixty-five years.'- This use allowed a reasonable return on their invest-
ment. Other cases indicate that owners of wetland property may not
have as great an expectation in development of the property as upland
owners. 
1 57
The Model Ordinance addresses this third issue by requiring local
governments to consider several factors relating to the investment-
backed expectations of the landowner. For example, the Model Ordi-
nance provides there exists no expectation in the development of
sovereignty submerged lands.,- Furthermore, because of stringent
state regulations of mangrove lands, the Model Ordinance provides
that owners have no reasonable development expectations in these
lands. 159 Likewise, owners of land with no road access are presumed
153. 399 So. 2d at 1376-77.
154. Id. at 1382.
155. MODEL ORDINANCE, supra note 1, § VII(F)(4)(a).
156. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 136.
157. See, e.g., Just v. Marinette County, 201 N.W.2d 761 (Wis. 1972).
158. MODEL ORDINANCE, supra note 1, § VII(F)(4)(b)(1).
159. Id. § VII(F)(4)(b)(2).
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to not have a reasonable development expectations.16° The Model Or-
dinance also requires the local government to evaluate the appraisal
value of the land, how much the owner paid for the land, when the
owner purchased the land, and existing uses of the land.16 ' Landowners
who have subdivided land since 1975 to create lots containing only
wetlands are presumed to not have a reasonable expectation of de-
velopment. 1- The Model Ordinance also allows the local government
to develop alternate design plans that will allow some use of the
property to show the owner is not deprived of all reasonable economic
use.'63
In cases where courts find the Model Ordinance is so restrictive
as to constitute a taking, a variance may be granted.'- Alternatively,
the local government may use its eminent domain power to purchase
the property. If this alternative is chosen, a conservation easement
shall be granted to protect the purchased property from future de-
velopment.'r
The importance of the Model Ordinance's variance procedure has
become more evident with the recent United States Supreme Court
decision in First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale
v. Los Angeles. - In First English, the Supreme Court held for the
first time that where a regulation is so restrictive as to constitute a
taking, invalidation of the regulation is not an adequate remedy. 67
Instead, the Court held that the Constitution requires the government
to pay monetary compensation for damages incurred up to the point
of judicial invalidation.' 6 First Lutheran owned and operated a camp
for handicapped children in Los Angeles county. 6 9 In 1978 all of the
camp buildings were destroyed by a flood. The county responded by
enacting a moratorium on building or reconstruction in the area. First
160. Id. § VII(F)(4)(b)(3).
161. Id. § VII(F)(3).
162. Id. § VII(F)(4)(b)(4).
163. Id. § VII(F)(4)(c).
164. Id. § VII(F).
165. Id. § 111(6). A conservation easement is a perpetual undivided right or interest in real
property which is appropriate to retaining land or water areas predominately in their natural,
scenic, open or wooded condition, retaining such areas as suitable for fish, plants, or wildlife,or
maintaining existing land uses, and which prohibits or limits certain specified activities which
involve altering the present use or state of the land or water areas. Conservation easements
are enforceable and run with the land.
166. 107 S. Ct. 2378 (1987).
167. Id. at 2389.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 2381.
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Lutheran then sued the county, alleging the county was liable for
damages because the regulation denied the church of all use of its
property. The California courts found that invalidation of a regulation
that amounted to a taking was a sufficient remedy. The Supreme
Court reversed holding that the Constitution requires the payment of
damages for the deprivation caused by the taking. 170 The Court was
not asked to decide, nor did it decide, whether the regulation did
indeed result in a taking. 171
The Model Ordinance minimizes the risk that the local government
may have to pay damages if a taking is found by establishing permit
review procedures to ensure that local governments consider the tak-
ing issue before final agency action is taken.172 A judicial determination
of whether an agency action results in a taking cannot be made until
the agency action is final. 173 Under the Model Ordinance, a permit
decision is not final until after the landowner has an opportunity to
present evidence on the taking issue. 174 If the local government finds
a taking does exist, it may grant the variance and eliminate the risk
of having to pay damages for the period of time the matter is tied up
in litigation. 175
5. Non-Delegation Doctrine
The non-delegation doctrine states that the delegation of legislative
authority to governmental officials without definite standards or
guidelines to constrain the scope of administrative decision-making is
unconstitutional.176 Thus, a local government ordinance that vests arbi-
trary discretion in local governmental administrative officials violates
the doctrine. 177 The purpose of the non-delegation doctrine is to imple-
170. Id. at 2389.
171. Id. at 2384-85. Because the court did not address the issue of whether the regulation
resulted in a taking, the "takings" analysis from previous case law still applies. See supra notes
127-165 and accompanying text. See also Simon, supra note 127, at 124-27 (discussing the impli-
cations of- the First English decision).
172. MODEL ORDINANCE, supra note 1, § VII(F).
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. See 0. REYNOLDS, supra note 13, at 160-61. The author states, however, that "[tihe
rule against delegation of state legislative authority is no barrier to the delegation of powers
of local self-government to local units." Id. at 160 (emphasis in original). This principle permits
a state government to delegate powers to local government that the state itself cannot directly
exercise.
177. Id. at 161-62. Three basic rules apply to delegations of authority by local governments:
(1) delegation of any governmental power to private individuals is impermissible; (2) delegation
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ment the constitutional separation of powers among branches of gov-
ernment. 7 8 In the leading Florida case on non-delegation, Askew v.
Cross Key Waterways, 79 the Florida Supreme Court held that sections
of the Florida Environmental Land and Water Management Act were
unconstitutional violations of the non-delegation doctrine because an
administrative body was required to make fundamental policy decisions
without adequate standards. 80
Although the Model Ordinance delegates decision-making authority
to the Issuing Authority, the delegation is accompanied by clear ex-
pressions of legislative intent and definite and precise standards. s
Local governments that use the Model Ordinance should not insert
additional open-ended standards such as "other factors deemed to be
in the public interest." Courts have invalidated these types of open-
ended standards because they fail to allow for adequate judicial review
and fail to adequately inform affected citizens of what such standards
mean.18
IV. CONCLUSION
In order to protect Florida's dwindling wetland resources, local
governments must enact stringent wetlands protection laws. Citizens
and local governments cannot rely upon state and federal agencies to
adequately protect these important natural resource systems. Local
governments are better equipped to regulate uses in wetlands as part
of their comprehensive planning responsibilities. Wetlands regulations
must meet several criteria to both insure their constitutionality to
minimize the risk of having to pay damages for temporary takings.
First, the regulation must be reasonably related to a valid regulatory
objective. A wetlands ordinance that only restricts activities that ad-
versely effect important wetlands functions will almost always survive
a substantive due process challenge.
of law-making or policy formulating powers is impermissible; and (3) any delegation of power
by the city's legislative body must be accompanied with adequate standards to guide the exercise
of the power. Id. at 162.
178. See Askew v. Cross Key Waterways, 372 So. 2d 913 (Fla. 1978) (interpreting the
separation of powers provision in article II, section 3 of the Florida Constitution).
179. 372 So. 2d 913 (Fla. 1978).
180. Id. at 925.
181. Section I clearly states the legislative intent underlying the ordinance. MODEL ORDI-
NANCE, supra note 1, § 1. In addition the ordinance classifies wetlands by type and further
specifies each type of wetland function the ordinance protects. Thus, the ordinance provides
clear guidelines to landowners.
182. See 0. Reynolds, supra note 13, at 167-68. See also Askew v. Cross Key Waterways,
372 So. 2d 913, 925 (Fla. 1978).
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Second, the regulation must not be so confiscatory as to constitute
a taking without just compensation. A wetlands ordinance should pro-
vide a screening mechanism that local governments can use to deter-
mine whether the application of the ordinance to a particular landowner
constitutes a taking; this determination must occur prior to final agency
action. This procedure minimizes the risk of successful taking chal-
lenges. If a taking does occur, the local government can grant a vari-
ance allowing the landowner the minimal economic use of his property
necessary to avoid a taking challenge. Alternatively, the local govern-
ment may choose to purchase the wetland property through its eminent
domain power. The Model Ordinance provides an outline of the factual
issues, based on existing case law, that local governments should con-
sider in the taking determination. The variance procedure allows a
local government to give a landowner an opportunity to present evi-
dence on the taking issue before final agency action is taken. Thus,
if the local government finds a taking does exist, it may grant the
variance eliminating the risk of having to pay damages for the period
of time the matter is tied up in litigation.
Finally, wetlands regulations must meet the constitutional require-
ments of procedural due process, equal protection, and the non-dele-
gation doctrine. These requirements are primarily matters of thorough
and precise drafting of the wetlands ordinance in conformity with
existing United States Supreme Court and Florida Supreme Court
case law. The Model Ordinance provides a prototype for local govern-
ments to utilize in drafting their own regulations to protect their
jurisdiction's wetlands systems.
APPENDIX
RELEVANT SECTIONS FROM
A MODEL WETLANDS PROTECTION ORDINANCE
I. FINDINGS OF FACTS AND OBJECTIVES
A. This ordinance is based on a finding based on the following
facts:
1. Both wetlands contiguous to waters of the state and
isolated wetlands serve the following important functions
in the regional hydrologic cycle and ecological system:
a. Riverine wetlands and adjacent floodplain lands
provide natural storage and conveyance of flood waters.
b. Coastal wetlands, and inland wetlands adjoining
larger lakes and rivers, act as barriers to waves and
erosion.
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c. Inland wetlands provide temporary storage of sur-
face waters during times of flood, thereby regulating
flood elevations and the timing, velocity, and rate of
flood discharges.
d. Wetlands reduce flood flows and the velocity of
flood waters, reducing erosion and causing flood waters
to release their sediment. Wetland vegetation filters
and holds sediment which would otherwise enter lakes
and streams.
e. Wetlands protect water bodies from sediments, nu-
trients, and other natural and man-made pollutants.
Wetland vegetation filters sediment, organic matter,
and chemicals. Microorganisms utilize dissolved nutri-
ents and breakdown organic matter.
f. Coastal wetlands are important sources of nutrients
for the commercial fish and shellfish industries. Inland
wetlands are also important to freshwater fisheries as
spawning grounds.
g. Both coastal and inland wetlands provide essential
breeding and predator escape habitats for many forms
of waterfowl, mammals, and reptiles.
h. Wetlands are depended upon by almost 35% of all
rare and endangered animal species.
i. Wetlands provide excellent recreational oppor-
tunities including recreational fishing, hunting, camp-
ing, photography, boating, and nature observation.
j. Wetlands are important as a source of ground and
surface water.
2. Considerable acreage of wetlands have been lost, and
their important functions impaired, by draining, dredging,
filling, excavating, building, polluting, and other acts. Re-
maining wetlands are in jeopardy of being lost or impaired
by such acts. The loss of important wetlands functions is
contrary to the public safety and welfare.
3. Current federal and state wetlands regulations provide
inadequate protection of important wetlands functions.
B. This ordinance has the following objectives:
1. To minimize the potential for property damage and
personal injury from flooding.
2. To prevent increases in erosion.
3. To maintain optimum storage capacity of watersheds.
4. To prevent increased sedimentation.
5. To maintain water quality.
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6. To maintain recharge for groundwater aquifers.
7. To maintain breeding, nesting, and feeding areas for
water fowl and shore birds, including rare and endangered
species.
8. To maintain the exchange of nutrients needed by fish
and other forms of wildlife.
9. To maintain habitat for fish and other wildlife.
10. To maintain sites needed for education and scientific
research as outdoor biophysical laboratories, classrooms,
and training areas.
11. To protect the public's rights in navigable waters.
12. To protect the recreation opportunities of wetlands
for hunting, fishing, boating, hiking, nature observation,
photography, camping, and other uses.
13. To protect aesthetic and property values.
IV. ACTIVITIES SUBJECT TO REGULATION UNDER THE ORDI-
NANCE:
1. Activities within the Areas Subject to Protection Under
the Ordinance
Any activity proposed or undertaken within an area
specified in Section III. which will remove, fill, drain,
dredge, or in any way alter that area is subject to regulation
under the Ordinance and requires the filing of a Notice of
Intent.
2. Activities within the Buffer Zone
Any activity proposed or undertaken within 100 feet of
an area specified in Section III. (hereinafter referred to as
the Buffer Zone) which, in the judgment of the Issuing
Authority, will alter an Area Subject to Protection Under
the Ordinance is subject to regulation under the ordinance
and requires the filing of a Notice of Intent. Any person
who proposes to perform work within the Buffer Zone shall
file a Request for a Determination of Applicability. The
request shall include sufficient information to enable the
issuing authority to find and view the area and to determine
whether the proposed work will alter an Area Subject to
Protection Under the Ordinance.
3. Areas Outside the Area Subject to Protection Under
the Act and the Buffer Zone Area Subject to Protection
Under the Act and the Buffer Zone
Any activity proposed or undertaken outside the areas
specified in Section III. and outside of the Buffer Zone is
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not subject to regulation under the Ordinance and does not
require the filing of a Notice of Intent unless and until that
activity actually alters an Area Subject to Protection Under
the Ordinance.
In the event that the Issuing Authority determines that
such activity has in fact altered an Area Subject to Protec-
tion Under the Ordinance, it shall impose such conditions,
including mitigation, on the activity or any portion thereof
as it deems necessary to contribute to the protection of the
functions identified in the Ordinance.
V. REGULATIONS FOR WATERCOURSES, WATER BODIES AND
WETLANDS
A. General Provision
The regulations contained in this Section apply to all ac-
tivities which will remove, fill, drain, dredge, or in any way
alter any contiguous or isolated wetland.
B. Presumptions and Burden of Proof
1. Presumptions of Function Performance
Each type of wetland subject to protection under the
Ordinance is presumed to perform the functions identified
in Section V.- C of the Ordinance.
2. Burden of Proof
Any person who files a Notice of Intent to perform any
activity within an Area Subject to Protection Under the
Ordinance, or within the Buffer Zone, has the burden of
demonstrating to the Issuing Authority that:
a. the particular wetland does not perform any of the
functions that it is presumed to; or
b. the proposed activity will have an insignificant ef-
fect on any of the functions the particular wetland is
presumed to perform.
3. Cumulative Effects
To show that the proposed activity will have an insig-
nificant effect on wetland functions, the applicant must
show that the cumulative impacts of all persons owning
land in that wetland carrying out the proposed activity
would have an insignificant effect on wetland functions. An
applicant can do this by showing that the cumulative impact
will have an insignificant effect on wetland functions, by
showing that the proposed activity is unique, and therefore,
will not be attempted by other landowners, or by showing
that other landowners are barred from attempting that
activity (i.e., because they have given a conservation ease-
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ment on their land, or because their land is in a Special
Management Area which prohibits the proposed activity).
G. Water Dependent Activities
1. Certain water dependent activities that are otherwise
impermissible, may be permitted if the applicant shows the
public interest served by the activity substantially out-
weighs any adverse environmental effects and that no prac-
ticable alternative for the activity exists. Any significant
adverse effects shall be first reduced by the imposition of
permit conditions such as those in Section V.-E. If permit
conditions are inadequate to reduce adverse effects to a
permissible level, mitigation shall be required. The appli-
cant does not have the burden to show no significant effect
for water dependent activities. Instead, the applicant has
the burden of showing the public interest served substan-
tially outweighs the adverse environmental effects.
Permissible water dependent activities may include:
a. Projects not exceeding 10,000 cubic yards of mate-
rial placed in or removed from watercourse, water
bodies or wetlands;
b. Dockage or marinas not exceeding 30,000 square
feet and containing less than 100 slips (existing and
proposed);
c. New riprap, vertical bulkheads, seawalls or similar
structures not exceeding 50 feet of shoreline;
d. Installation of buoys, aids to navigation, signs, and
fences;
e. Performance for 10 years from the date of the orig-
inal permit, maintenance dredging;
f. Installation of subaqueous transmission and distri-
bution lines entrenched in (not exceeding 10,000 cubic
yards of dredging), laid on, or embedded in bottom
waters which carry water, wastewater, electricity,
communication cables, oil or gas;
g. Construction of foot bridges and vehicular bridges;
h. Replacement or widening of bridges on pilings or
trestles where the effects of pollutants discharged into
open waters can be minimized;
i. Construction of artificial reefs;
j. Performance of maintenance dredging, as long as
less than 10,000 cubic yards of material is removed.
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k. Public utilities and other public service activities
that require corridors as a location.
2. Water dependent activities do not include waterfront
housing.
VII. ADMINISTRATION
E. Judicial Review
1. Any decision denying or approving a permit shall be
judicially reviewable in Circuit Court.
2. Any person adversely affected by a decision shall have
standing to challenge the decision as being unconstitutional,
or inconsistent with the goals of the Ordinance
F. Variances
1. A variance may be given where an applicant succeeds
in a challenge of the application of the Ordinance as being
so restrictive as to constitute a "taking."
2. A taking will only be found where the ordinance, as
applied to an applicant's land, is so restrictive as to deprive
the landowner of substantially all of the use of his property.
3. When an applicant challenges the ordinance as applied
to him as a taking, the Issuing Authority shall hold a hear-
ing at which the applicant may present evidence to support
his challenge. The Issuing Authority shall hear evidence
and make the final determination as to the taking issue.
In making the taking determination, the Issuing Authority
shall consider factors such as:
a. How much the owner paid for the property.
b. When the owner purchased the property.
c. Current fair market value of the property.
d. If the owner owns any additional property which
may by benefited by leaving the wetland property in
its natural state. Such benefits may include view, ac-
cess to water, and docks.
4. A taking does not exist, and therefore, a variance will
not be given if:
a. The site contains developable uplands as well as
wetlands (the Issuing Authority may provide for the
maximum use of the applicant's uplands by allowing
"cluster" development in the uplands or by providing
the applicant with transferrable density rights).
b. The applicant does not have reasonable develop-
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ment expectations in his wetland property. No reason-
able development expectation exists when:
1. The property involved is submerged land.
2. The property involved is a mangrove forest.
3. The property involved has no road access.
4. The property involved was subdivided after
1975 so as to make the lot contain only wetlands.
c. The Issuing Authority can show an alternate design
plan that will allow some use of the property.
5. A variance will be granted only to the extent necessary
to allow a reasonable use to avoid a finding of a taking.
6. If an applicant qualifies for a variance, mitigation shall
be required to ensure no net loss of wetland function re-
sults.
7. As an alternative to granting a variance when applica-
tion of the ordinance would result in a taking, the Issuing
Authority may use its eminent domain power to purchase
the property from the applicant. Where the Issuing Author-
ity chooses this alternative, a conservation easement shall
be granted to protect the purchased property from future
development.
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